

The Establishment of Khilafah and the Distortion of the Meaning of Jihad Islamic Teaching: Views of Pesantren Kyai

Afifuddin¹

Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar,
Indonesia

afifuddinhrs@gmail.com

Wahdatun Nisa²

Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Adji Muhammad Idrus
Samarinda, Indonesia

wahdatunnisa@iain-samarinda.ac.id

Noorthaibah³

Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Adji Muhammad
Idrus Samarinda, Indonesia

northaibah@iain-samarinda.ac.id

Siti Julaiha⁴

Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Adji Muhammad Idrus
Samarinda, Indonesia

siti.julaiha@iain-samarinda.ac.id

Suraijjah⁵

Universitas Islam Negeri Antasari Banjarmasin,
Indonesia

suraijjah@gmail.com

Fathul Jannah⁶

Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Adji Muhammad Idrus
Samarinda, Indonesia

jannahfathul168@gmail.com

Agus Setiawan⁷

Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Adji Muhammad
Idrus Samarinda, Indonesia

agus.setiawan@iain-samarinda.ac.id

Abstract

This paper aimed to discuss the discourse offered by Hizbut-Tahrir about khilafah and the interpretation of jihad that had been spread in Islamic teachings in various places, as well as the views of Islamic boarding school clerics (kyai of pesantren) in South Sulawesi about the deviation of the intrinsic meaning of jihad. This study was qualitative research with a sociological approach, with no intention to generalize the results of data analysis. The author conducted an in-depth study of the literature on the concept of jihad, especially in the perspective of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, and traced the views of kyai of pesantren in South Sulawesi about jihad in Islam. It was hoped that the views of these kyai could compensate and restore the distorted meaning of jihad which had been misinterpreted to legitimize violence and radicalism as a method to uphold khilafah, which was claimed as a Shari'a obligation. Kyai and pesantren in South Sulawesi viewed that jihad is solely for the benefit and goodness of religion and people, not to mean war, frightening, imposing opinions, and, let alone, enforcing the power in radical ways.

Keywords

Khilafah, distortion of the meaning of jihad, views of kyai, Islamic teaching.

To cite this article: Afifuddin, Nisa, W.; Noorthaibah, Julaiha, S, Suraijjah, Jannah, F and Setiawan, A. (2021) The Establishment of Khilafah and the Distortion of the Meaning of Jihad Islamic Teaching: Views of Pesantren Kyai. *Review of International Geographical Education (RIGEO)*, 11(5), 4348-4360. doi: 10.48047/rigeo.11.05.314

Submitted: 10-10-2020 • **Revised:** 12-12-2020 • **Accepted:** 16-02-2021

Introduction

Discourse about khilafah (Islamic State) has long been run until now. The current debate/discourse explains Khilafah (Caliphate), which is an Islamic teaching that must be applied to Muslims. On the other hand, it is understood as a historical fact because it contrasts with the Indonesian national political system (Jauhari, Suryandaru, & Sugihartati, 2021). Religious groups that have longing expressions of the existence of the Caliphate are identified as "radical" or "terrorist" groups. Stigmatization of the Caliphate idea is a product of securitization of religious discourse that develops in society (Wibowo, 2020). This war of ideas is nothing but illustrates a hard conflict in terms of opinion between those who try to Islamize everything and those who try to limit the area of Islam. In the perspective of Islamic thought, such a conflict is natural. What is regrettable, however, is when differences of opinion continue and spread to the behavior of takfir (considering others to be infidels) and radical efforts to impose certain ideas. What is unfortunate also is when the discourse of Islamic political debate and encouragement to enforce political power in the name of Islam penetrates into the campuses and schools. Ta'lim and tarbiyah activities carried out on campus and student Islamic organizations appear to be positive activities. Observations, instead, found that the activities that attract the interest of many of the young generation spread a rigid and destructive understanding of religion. Currently, the concept of caliphate is one of the substances of Islamic education learning in madrasas, and the development of its paradigm towards a form of contextualization of the vision, mission and strategy of national education development, namely in KMA 183 of 2019, the caliphate lesson has been transferred from Fiqh subjects to Islamic Cultural History and policy making from various aspects, one of which is the effort to contextualize the Islamic Education Study (ZAKI, 2020). One study suggests that there are efforts by scholars of Islamic Studies from Indonesia to include Indonesian Islamic literacy as part of the phenomenon of global Islamism manifestations in the development of contemporary Islamic movement studies in order to understand the term caliphate (Tambunan, 2019). The teachings offered, which actually should prioritize the nobility and perfection of worship to God, precisely foster hard characters which are easily ignited by the agitation of distorted jihad to establish Islamic political power called the khilafah. Actually, it is no longer urgent to debate the necessity of establishing an Islamic State, in the context of the very lack of public trust in existing power systems. The question emerging is whether or not the problems of the nation can immediately be resolved by establishing the Islamic state. Have the initiators of khilafah prepared a clear and complete concept of how and what is meant by the Islamic Caliphate? In general, the Islamic khilafah still leaves assumptions in relation to the punishments in the form of cutting off hands, stoning, 'hijab' obligation for women, and some highly normative juridical dogmas. The politicization of the meaning of khilafah then makes this position more widely understood as a form of authority of political power legitimized by religion. All policies and decisions issued by the Caliph are considered as the decree of religion, in which Muslims must submit and obey. The decision of the Caliph is seen as absolute truth which meant that opposition to it is considered as disbelief act. Some contemporary scholars, including Ali Abd al-Raziq, reject this concept. Ali Abd. al-Raziq's views were the claim that caliphate has no basis, whether in the Qur'an, the traditions or the consensus (ijmac) and the assertion of separation between religion and political power (Adam et al., 2015). In his book, the title is *al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm: Bahs fi al-Khilafah wa al-Hukumah fi al-Islam*, he argues that khilafah is not an obligation in Islam (Siregar, 2018). The concept of khilafah has in fact experienced distortion throughout the political history of Muslims. Hizb ut-Tahrir as the organization that drives the caliphate movement in Indonesia. The tensions between HTI and other elements of Indonesian society regarding state regulation symbolize the ongoing competition between Islamist and nationalist groups, (Kartini, 2016) as well as tensions with the government so that HTI as an organization has been disbanded. According to Vernie Liebl in a journal that the Khilafah was abolished 85 years ago; there have been several attempts to revive it since then (Liebl, 2009). The real khilafah (in the sense of the successor of the Prophet in maintaining the religious continuity of Muslims after his death) is a system of government that took place in the early days of Islam, more precisely the rules of Abu Bakr, Umar bin Khattab, Uthman bin Affan, and Ali bin Abi Talib. They were all the Caliphs of the Prophet who carried out the tasks of continuing and preserving the religious life of the early Islamic community. However, in its development, the term khilafah experienced a narrowing of meaning, which is to indicate to the party or someone who is in charge of maintaining the people and practicing the teachings of

Islam in certain places. Ironically, political tendencies and Arab primordialism ('ashabiyah) have encouraged Arab rulers to claim themselves as Caliphs and distort the values of khilafah to establish an absolute power over their people. The scholars, both Salaf and Khalaf, agreed on the obligation to uphold religious leadership inspired by the concept of al-imamah that in a Muslim community there must be an Imam (leader) who is deemed capable of resolving religious matters (ri'ayat syu'un al-ummah) (Al-Ashbahani, 1996). Likewise, the obligation of conducting amar ma'ruf and nahi munkar is very dependent on the presence of leaders. Muslims must be united in one leadership (imamah). But it must be understood that the 'illat is a political, not a religious, reason. The obligation to have an Imam must be positioned as a political and social obligation to preserve Muslim communities, not as religious obligation or God's command. When the doctrine that khilafah is an obligation becomes "hard" and find a condition which, according to the views of its warriors, has deviated from the teachings of the Prophet in the early days of Islam, its warriors start to offer the concept of jihad as both an instrument of justification and a means of struggle to enforce the establishment of khilafah. The practical logic is that jihad is a struggle to uphold the Shari'a of God and realizing the amar ma'ruf nahi munkar is mandatory. Khilafah is also established to uphold the Shari'a of Allah and facilitate the implementation of the amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar. So, if jihad is mandatory, then Khilafah is absolutely mandatory. If khilafah must be upheld, then there is no other way, jihad must be performed, and that is the command of Allah through His sacred verses. Consequently, denying Allah's commands is considered as disbelief (kufr) and disbelief must be confronted with violence (asyidda' 'ala al-kuffar) so, for this reason, it is considered lawful to kill and fight infidels. Regrettably, Islamic teachings and da'wah have been contaminated by efforts to divert the meanings of khilafah and jihad into political agitation and divisions of the people. There is a great deal of confusion in the West regarding the meaning of Jihad and the role it is playing in shaping the Muslim world (Mohammad, 1985). In some Islamic education environments, the themes of khilafah and jihad are taught within the framework of rejection of legitimated and democratic governance, becoming the legitimacy of violence to take over the power and ultimately leading to radical actions that destroy the joints of peace. Efforts to stem radicalism, which have so far been more focused on terrorists or warfighters, have not been carried out much as an understood precaution and radical action (Fuad & 'Arifuddin, 2021). This is very contrary to the ideals of religious education that strive to create social peace and harmonious relations (Susanto, 2006). Therefore, in this paper, the author describes a critical study of the meanings of khilafah and jihad which are taught in a deviant manner and the views of Islamic boarding school clerics (kyai of pesantren) in South Sulawesi about the distortion of the understanding, as well as their attitudes of rejection of the efforts and extreme radical understanding in the name of jihad and the establishment of khilafah in Indonesia.

Literature Review

Jihad, Terrorism, and Legitimacy of Violence

A series of unforgettable big events in world history are representations of violence (radicalism) in the name of religion. The Bali bombings and the attack on the two World Trade Center (WTC) skyscrapers in America, brutal shootings in Paris and England, ISIS violence, and other tragedies that were no less sadistic have attracted the world's attention and made everyone aware that violence is still regarded as ways to solve problems. ISIS has deployed the management of savagery doctrine through acts of terrorism as part of its strategy to increase polarisation by exacerbating fear and distrust among communities (Turner, 2020). Terrorism by certain groups by spreading fear everywhere is now almost an international crime trend, even in Indonesia, comparable to the drug problem that has become part of the international crisis. Terrorism and religious radicalism are actually not only a problem of the perpetrators, and not the people who are victims of these actions, but terrorism and radicalism that must be paid attention to are problems of theological beliefs, meaning that the perpetrators can be arrested, imprisoned, and killed, but ideological beliefs and doctrines are not easily abolished (Faqihuddin, 2021). Rumadi (2002) stated that when terrorism has developed in such a way, security becomes something very expensive (Rumadi, 2002). The WTC and Pentagon cases have indeed formed an opinion that Islam - precisely the fundamentalist Muslims - have become "accused" in various terrorist incidents. According to Tjahjo, the media reality of the September 11 tragedy and the US military attack on Afghanistan is not identical in empirical reality because it involves factual issues (accuracy and completeness of facts), impartiality (balance of sources), and frames (disclosure

and concealment of facts). Abdulla (2007) research results show that some people view the attack as a political problem, not a religious one (Abdulla, 2007) . Such accusations are actually not new to Muslims. From the earliest days when the hegemony of Western civilization became increasingly widespread in various parts of the Muslim world, groups of Muslims emerged who tried to carry out ideological resistance against the West, often in ways that could provoke violence. Therefore, the concept of jihad is often linked, even used as the legitimacy of various cases leading to terrorism. It is not entirely wrong to associate jihad and terrorism because many facts prove that the meaning of jihad often involves elements of violence that can be categorized as terrorism, although it must be admitted that violence in the name of religion in modern times is mostly caused by political factors, for which religious legitimacy is sought. Terrorism begins with a misguided understanding of jihad. Some moslems perceive the concept of jihad simply on the perspective of political ideology. Jihad is understood as fight against external enemies. Referring to the classical literatures, the meaning of jihad, can be corrected to be more conceptual and practical. Jihad should contain a concept of collective struggle to overcome the actual problems faced by moslems such as economy, law, and education (Chirzin, 2006). Jihad that should be interpreted as "hard effort and patience" then turned into an ideological understanding that gave birth to puritanism, which has, at least, four characteristics, namely 1) being intolerant of differences, 2) tending to think literally and ignore the socio-historical aspects, 3) choosing the path of violence and hatred rather than dialogue and brotherhood, and 4) being petty and exclusive and doing things without clear goals and missions. Puritanism, slowly but surely, will foster radicalism which will eventually lead to terrorism. Azra and Al-Jauhari (1996) argued that terrorism and acts of violence when associated with the concept of jihad will raise the issue of the boundary between justifiable and unjustifiable violence. The grouping is very relative and very much depends on the desire of the interpreting party. Something that is considered justifiable by certain groups may be unjustifiable by the others (Azra & Al-Jauhari, 1996). The case of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is a clear example. Both of these international organizations are seen by many, especially the West, as terrorists, unjustifiable. Other parties, meanwhile, view Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as a representation of Muslims who struggle from oppression, thus considered as justifiable. In addition, the phenomenon of terrorism in the name of Islam in the form of suicide bombings has been very troubling this nation in the last ten years. Many parties criticized and blamed Islam for the incidents, which by the perpetrators were considered a struggle to defend religion or, in other words, "jihad". One thing that is highlighted is the weakness of Islamic education and, at the same time, the involvement of Islamic education institutions in spreading extreme and dangerous understandings through non-formal channels. Sociology and education experts have mentioned that there are certain communities that carry out Islamic preaching and teaching activities both on campus and public schools, using the term *tarbiyah* and *ta'lim*, which play a notable role in indoctrinating students to carry out "violent jihad". The meaning of jihad according to them, based on reading from radical references, is terror, resistance, extermination, destruction, murder, and, even, willingness to commit suicide (*intihar*), as an expression of hatred towards others and a way to seize the domination of ideological and territorial power. The *murabbis* (mentors) deliberately divert students from the conception of jihad agreed upon by scholars throughout the ages, namely jihad as a concept of the struggle to defend religion in Islam. This is the beginning of why terrorism is identified with Islam. In fact, the model of jihad practiced by terrorists by suicide bombings and killing of innocent people is very different from the concept of jihad which is actually in accordance with the Qur'an (Umar, 1999). These actions are nothing but a form of religious radicalism by a number of adherents.

Khilafah and the Distortion of the Meaning of Jihad

Indonesia, with Pancasila as the basis of nationhood and state, has established itself neither a religious state nor an anti-religious (secular) state. But, all the religions and beliefs recognized for their existence can coexist among their adherents without mutual hostility between fellow citizens. The Indonesian state system, based on Pancasila, is in accordance with the state system adopted by the Prophet in Medina in the midst of a pluralist society. The Medina Charter (*Mitsaq al-Madinah*) as a formal constitution agreed upon by all parties included a state system that is concerned with the importance of religion towards unity and justice. It, as a constitution, in fact, did not mention certain 'religions', let alone the khilafah system. In one of his writings, Cholil Nafis,

chairman of the Central MUI Da'wah Commission, stressed that the Qur'an does not mention a state system based on khilafah but calls it a human obligation to carry out the function of the caliph in his life on earth. Being a caliph is the duty of individual humans to build the earth and society in accordance with the capacities and conditions that allow for the good of mankind, while the pattern depends on the conditions and situations, as well as the benefits to be achieved (Rasyid, 2016). One important clause in the Medina constitution stated that Muslims and non-Muslim citizens agreed to defend the city of Medina and to be united in resisting attacks of the enemies together. This implied the value of nationalism the Prophet instilled in the soul of the people of Medina, at that time. He, despite being a unifying figure and respected by all elements, did not order the formation of a "religious state" system belonging to Muslims. There was no country name that appeared in his traditions. Islamic Shari'a applied but the life of society went according to the agreement in terms of tolerance, humanism, and pluralism. Al-khilafah, etymologically, is not synonymous with power or government (Rasyid, 2016). Khilafah means something that comes later or follows. It can also mean replacing someone in the place he left behind. A caliph is a person who replaces another one in carrying out a business or job. Ibn Khaldun, more specifically, said that khilafah is intended to mobilize and bring the people to the goals desired by religion (shar'i). In essence, a caliph is someone who replaces the position of the Prophet in guarding and maintaining religion and worldly affairs (Khaldun, 2011). Referring to Muhammad and Khalid (1993) opinion, imamah or khilafah is intended to take over the role of the Prophet in preserving religion and regulating the people life arrangements in the world, as was the life of the Muslim community in the early period in Medina (Muhammad & Khalid, 1993). The phrase "successor to the Prophet", in Muhammad and Khalid (1993) view, does not mean replacing Muhammad's position as a prophet, but in the sense that the caliph is both a religious leader and also a government. The khilafah system in the Islamic world collapsed in 1924. Since then, the application of the concept of khilafah turned into a shadow that has always been infiltrated with memories of past wounds, wars, cruel authoritarian leaders, glamorous royal elites, and so on (Munadzir, 2017). However, on the other hand, the golden age of Islam was on the stage of khilafah. The beginning of the progress of Islam in various disciplines of knowledge was in the era of Khilafah (Ahyar, 2018). This historical reality has led to the ambiguity of Muslim clerics in addressing the khilafah discourse. Some Muslim scholars reject the concept of khilafah based on the argument of historical relevance, that its concept is no longer in line with political democratization and modern governance. Several other scholars indicate that the concept of khilafah carried out by several groups after the Arab Spring phenomenon has the complexity of socio-political problems, which requires them to adapt between Islamic norms and modern democratic values (Ahyar, 2017). According to the author, the concept of imamah or khilafah in Islam must be interpreted within the framework of leadership in general, without referring to the system and culture of a certain locality. Imamah or khilafah functions as hirasatuddin wa siyasatuddunya, which is to preserve religion and regulate world life, in the sense that if religion and community life have been protected, so that there is no pressure or obstruction to carry out religious teachings, and the life and welfare of the community is well guaranteed, then the substance of imamah or khilafah in Islam has been aspired. So, the term khilafah is not sacred in religion. The most important thing is the nature and purpose of ensuring the sustainability of the religion and the benefits of the people. However, today, the concept of khilafah is distorted towards narrow and formalistic legal interpretations, which impact on the same distortion of the meaning of jihad as its main pillar. The concept and idealism of the establishment of khilafah were re-raised by Taqiyuddin Al-Nabhani, and in the 1980s were brought into Indonesia by Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, which in turn formed the basis of the organization which was very keen to voice the Khilafah government, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). This organization itself is an extension of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which was founded in 1953 in Palestinian Quds and is a transnational movement. Khilafah according to Hizbut-Tahrir is understood as general leadership (riyah 'ammah) for all Muslims in the world by enforcing Islamic laws and preaching throughout the world (Al-Nabhani, 2002). While the caliph is a person who represents the people in carrying out government and power and implementing sharia laws (Tahrir, 2005). Ontologically, khilafah in this version necessitates great ideals and a serious struggle to uphold political ideals, which some consider to be a utopia. Therefore, HTI views that efforts to uphold khilafah, both in the form of thoughts, campaigns, and real actions, are "holy" jihad with the pretext of upholding the sentence of Allah on earth. In interpreting jihad, Tahrir (2005) refers to books written by its founder, Al-Nabhani (2002) specifically al-Saykhsiyyah al-Islamiyah, and to other references written by Tahrir (2005) circles, such as the book of al-Jihad wa al-Qital fi al-Siyasah al-Syar'iyah by Haikal (1996b)

and the book *Diskursus Islam Politik dan Spiritual (Political and Spiritual Islamic Discourse)* written by [Abdurrahman \(2002\)](#), one of the [Tahrir, \(2005\)](#) Indonesian syabab.

In the perspective of Hizb ut-Tahrir, jihad is:

بذل الوسع في القتال في سبيل الله مباشرة أو معاونة بمال أو رأي أو تكثير سواد أو غير ذلك

“Jihad is to exert all abilities in war in the way of Allah, both to go to war directly or to provide assistance for war, for example assistance in the form of assets, opinions, increasing the number of troops, and others” ([Al-Nabhani, 2002](#)).

Jihad with wealth is giving away property for everything related to war directly (*mubasyarah*), for example giving funds, clothing, and medicines to the mujahideen on the battlefield. Dedicating wealth to something that is not directly related to war such as helping the poor and orphans, helping victims of natural disasters, helping Islamic financial institutions, building religious education institutions, and so on, cannot be called jihad, according to sharia understanding. Likewise, jihad with opinion is only providing opinions related to war directly (*mubasyarah*), such as giving an opinion on setting the location of troops on the battlefield, and those on what weapons are used in an attack and so on. An opinion that is not directly related to war, such as writing a book of fiqh, commentary, hadith and so on, cannot be called jihad in the sense of sharia ([Haddade, Harisah, & Irsyad, 2017](#)). Thus, in the view of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the main problem (*mihwar*) is not the implications or benefits of an action that is categorized as jihad, nor is the difficulty factor (*masyaqqah*), nor is the mobilization of all power (*bazl al-juhud*), but the legal meaning contained by a word in Islamic texts. So, Hizb ut-Tahrir defines jihad in its legal meaning that is specifically only to be used in the sense of war and all those related to physical war directly ([Haddade et al., 2017](#)). Here the connection between jihad and war (*qital*) is clear. Jihad is essentially a war that specifically carried out by Muslims against infidels who do not have agreements with Muslims. However, it can also be in the form of other activities than war, as long as there is a direct connection with war, such as giving financial assistance to the mujahidin who are at war and so on. Included here is if the struggle to enforce khilafah gets terror, threats, or obstacles, then jihad is also required in the form of physical warfare to those who block it. Any party who does not support or obstruct the establishment of khilafah may be seen as an “infidel” who must be fought otherwise no jihad has been carried out. However, it was also explained that sometimes the Islamic legal texts, both the Qur’an and the Hadith, use the word jihad in terminology, but etymologically. According to Muhammad Khair Haikal, jihad can be interpreted as *majazi* (figuratively), which is not interpreted according to the meaning stipulated by sharia, but interpreted according to the literal meaning, because there is *qarinah* (indications) that divert it from its original meaning (*haqiqah*). *Qaidah ushul* (the basic rule), in this case, states “*al-ashl fi al-kalam al-haqiqah wa laa yusrafu ila al-majaz illa bi al-qarinah*” (the origin of a word is its intrinsic meaning, it is not transferred to the meaning of *majazah* unless there is *qarinah*) ([Haikal, 1996a](#)). In the same source, Haikal also emphasized that defining jihad as war as its specific meaning, as practiced by Hizb ut-Tahrir, was not new. The opinion of [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) is actually in line with the opinion of the Four Schools (*al-mazahib al-Arba’ah*), which are the models of the majority of Muslims. All schools agree, according to [Haikal \(1996a\)](#), that jihad actually means war. In its method of struggle to re-establish khilafah, [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) only carries out *da’wah* in political activities (*a’mal siyasiyah*), such as criticizing the authorities, organizing peaceful demonstrations (*masirah*), sending delegations to politicians, and so on. These kinds of political struggle are not called jihad, because the meaning of jihad, legally, is war and everything related to it, while [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) does neither use physical force (*al-quwwah al-maddiyyah*) nor take up arms against the ruler or anyone who opposes and blocks the propaganda of [Tahrir \(2005\)](#). All this was done by [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) in order to emulate the Prophet, especially in the *da’wah* phase in Mecca, in which the Prophet only preached without taking up arms. Here we see the attitude and mindset of [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) which tends to be contradictory and ambiguous. It, on one side, calls for the establishment of khilafah on the basis of strict sharia enforcement but, on the other hand, it abandons jihad, which should be the main way of establishing political power. Without political power, it is impossible for sharia to be upheld. Strangely, [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) views that jihad is an absolute obligation. That is, whether or not khilafah exists, jihad is still mandatory. So, if there is no khilafah, then who is authorized to organize jihad or war? Will this, in effect, give anyone the freedom to fight another who is seen as an “enemy of religion” on the basis of jihad? At this point, the problem of the ambiguity of the concept of jihad of the supporters of khilafah in the view of [Tahrir \(2005\)](#) lies.

Substance of Jihad: Persistence and Patience

After the exploration of the interpretation and meaning of the term jihad in popular literature, it can be argued that, in totality, the ideology of jihad represents a religiously sanctioned aggressive war to spread and maintain the faith (religion). Countries or communities that reject the teachings of Islam are considered as dar al-harb, namely areas that must be fought. As quoted from Khadduri and Bassutil, the basis of such a meaning of jihad is the division of the world into two categories, namely dar al-Islam and dar al-harb in the concept of Islamic international law (Ali & Rehman, 2005). Jihad is the real struggle whether with the soul, materials, verbal acts and thoughts in order to uphold the religion and Islamic values peacefully. Instead of terrorizing, threatening, frightening the masses with certain motives and goals (Asmara, 2016). Here, the meaning of jihad, by some writers and scholars, has been radically narrowed down to being limited to physical warfare. As a result, jihad is more identical as expansion and holy war, deviating from the substance as a peaceful path in da'wah. From the research of Rif'at and Muttaqin that Ibn Qayyim explained that jihad consists of 13 levels. These levels can be reduced to four parts, which one of them is fighting the infidels. Jihad against the infidels is not using the weapons. There are several steps that must be passed, so that jihad to infidels can be done. Of this division is also seen that the jihad war is not the only (Ma'afi & Muttaqin, 2012). The basic aim of jihad in Islam, according to Umar (1999), is actually to direct and make people worship Allah alone, avoiding them from worshiping to others, eradicating oppression, cruelty, and destruction on earth. Therefore, studying religious knowledge (tafaquh fi al-din) is also part of jihad, which is to do something seriously and hard work (Umar, 1999), to avoid ignorance and achieve knowledge and perfection in religion. It can be concluded that, in essence, Islam is a religion that invites humanity to fight for justice, equality, responsible freedom, social benefit, and global respect. The concept of jihad, for this reason, should be interpreted correctly and proportionally. Two things that really need to be considered in interpreting jihad are, first, that the current global condition is very much different from the condition at the time the revelation was revealed. Categorization of the people still pivots on three groups, namely Muslims (the people of the Prophet Muhammad who believe), infidels (religious people or other faiths other than Islam, and hypocrites (those who hide disbelief while showing their Islam). This categorization is very difficult to apply now, so automatically determining the goal of jihad is not as easy as imagined. Secondly, jihad in the sense of war can only be carried out on countries or territories that are considered dar al-harb, namely regions or communities that are legally legitimate to be attacked. The problem is who has the right and authority to determine the status of dar al-harb? It is impossible to break away from political tendencies in the current state relations system. Jihad, referring to its origin, namely jahada yajhadu, means hard effort to overcome difficulties (Ali & Rehman, 2005). So, jihad is not necessarily and not always synonymous with war and violence. Jihad can be interpreted as striving to achieve a better and more humane life, in peaceful and wise ways. Jihad can also be interpreted as war and bloodshed in only three contexts, namely, first, the meeting of two troops when fighting; secondly, the country is occupied by enemies, and; thirdly, the priest (leader of the state) commands war. Besides these three, jihad must be released from the connotation of violence. The commentary put forward by Muhammad Said Ramadhan al-Buthi, one of the leading Middle Eastern scholars and thinkers, about the essence and historicity of the concept of jihad in Islam is very interesting. Many people assume that jihad, as a very fundamental part of Islamic teachings, is prescribed (enacted) in Medina after the hijrah of the Apostle, as evidenced by the wars that occurred against the Quraish infidels. This means that there was no Shari'a about jihad in the Islamic period in Mecca before the hijrah. The Messenger of Allah and his Companions performed 'jihad' in Medina only, not in Mecca. This is a very wrong view. According to al-Buthi's view, the period of the Prophet's life in Mecca was inseparable from jihad. In fact, it was jihad that was very dominant in the attitude of Islamic defense and preaching at that time. Jihad in Medina is as effective as that in Mecca. The verses of the Qur'an commanded Muslims to perform jihad both in Mecca and Medina, in the same substance, but with different phenomena (Al-Buthi, 1993). In Q.S. Al-Furqan (25): 52, Allah Almighty commanded His Messenger to strive as much as possible against the infidels,

“So do not obey the disbelievers, and strive against them with the Qur'an a great striving”
(Agama, 1989).

In another verse, Q.S. Al-Nahl (16): 110, Allah says, meaning

"Then, indeed your Lord, to those who emigrated after they had been compelled [to renounce their religion] and thereafter fought [for the cause of Allah] and were patient - indeed, your Lord, after that, is Forgiving and Merciful" (Agama, 1989).

The two verses above, according to jumhur ulama mufassirun, are makkiyah, revealed and applied in Mecca before the Prophet emigrated, precisely when the Prophet and his companions underwent severe trials and cruel treatment from the Quraysh infidels. History explains that throughout the life of the Prophet in Mecca, there was absolutely no war, acts of terror, or armed resistance by Muslims against the infidels. But, in such conditions, they have in fact applied Allah's command to do jihad. Patience, firmness, and endless efforts to eliminate polytheism and invite the ignorant community to monotheism is jihad, which is even the most important jihad in Islamic history itself. The Holy Prophet and his Companions were treated inhumanely, with persecution, without mercy, and with immeasurable interference. But all of that did not make them tremble but, instead, increasingly persistent in challenging the danger of spreading Islam and maintaining faith. The Prophet strove in Mecca with patience and perseverance, not with weapons and war. Even if there are wars (gazwah) in the history of da'wah, it must be noted that these wars were defensive in nature and were to respond to the threats, aggression, and actions hampering preaching, not to force people to believe. Ibn Rushd, in his Muqaddimah, put forward four types of jihad, namely jihad with heart, words (speech), hands, and sword. Jihad by words is amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and is intended for hypocrites. The jihad with the sword is for infidels (Khaldun, 2011). In QS. Al-Taubah (9): 73, In QS. Al-Taubah (9): 73, Allah commands His Prophet to perform jihad towards both groups and, of course in different ways.

"O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, ..." (Agama, 1989).

Related to the above verse, al-Buthi gave an explanation that jihad with the sword, in the sense of physical resistance, to infidels was carried out after they were properly charged and given an argument (hujjah) for their error. Moreover, war is carried out if the opposing party has openly displayed hostility towards Muslims, obstructing da'wah, and threatening the safety of Muslims (Al-Buthi, 1993). Shaykh Manshur bin Yunus al-Bahwati, in his view of the meaning of jihad, stated that jihad in the general sense is a collective obligation (fardh kifayah) of Muslims which includes the implementation of Islamic da'wah accompanied by rebuttals to all accusations directed to Islam (syubhat) and the establishment of industries that meet the needs of the people both religious, worldly, physical, and economic needs (Al-Buthi, 1993). Diverse opinions about the meaning and scope of jihad are actually arguments that deny the notion that narrows the meaning of jihad to mere violence. Fundamentalist radicals, especially those who espouse the concept of khilafah or imamah 'ammah, pay attention to the da'wah efforts that lead to coercion, blasphemy, threats, and terror to realize social change radically, far greater than their attention to contribute to developing education Islam, constructing pesantren and madrasa, providing social services, and strengthening the people's economy. Educating Muslim children to avoid disobedience and helping the poor do not engage in illicit professions has far more values of jihad than raiding and destroying immoral places without regard to applicable laws.

Methodology

This study was qualitative research with a sociological approach, with no intention to generalize the results of data analysis. The author conducted an in-depth study of the literature on the concept of jihad, especially in the perspective of Tahrir (2005) Indonesia, and traced the views of kyai of pesantren in South Sulawesi about jihad in Islam. It was hoped that the views of these kyai could compensate and restore the distorted meaning of jihad which had been misinterpreted to legitimize violence and radicalism as a method to uphold khilafah, which was claimed as a Shari'a obligation.

Findings and Discussion

In principle, all Islamic educational institutions, both pesantren and non-pesantren, firmly reject any act of violence against humanity. The problem is, in terms of violence in the name of Islam or, in other words, violence to defend Islam (li 'ilāi kalimatillāh hiyal ulya), there are still views that legitimize the importance and the possibility of attacking and even taking up arms towards the

parties who are considered “enemies” of Islam. Here is where jihad becomes the justification for the radicalization of religion that has been raging lately, especially among the younger generation of Islam. Jihad is interpreted in various meanings and interests (Irawan, 2014). For them, jihad fi sabilillah is just as compulsory as other worship which is condemned by Allah; leaving it is a grave sin. They are obliged to do so even anarchically, causing bloodshed, and violating human rights.

In the view of kyai who manage Islamic boarding schools in South Sulawesi, jihad does not have to be synonymous with acts of violence, especially if it is linked with the rights and freedom of belief. This phenomenon is inseparable from the mistake of defining jihad as a religious obligation and militancy that is not accompanied by a complete understanding of the extent to which Islam tolerates violence in the name of religion. What is deeply regretted is that, in reality, militancy and misguided understanding are accompanied by political tendencies and ambitions, not purely for dak'wah lillah ta'ala. Muzakkir Arif, one of the main managers of Darul Istiqamah Maccopa Islamic Boarding School, shared the same opinion, that tafaqquh fi al-din is an important foundation in fostering a tolerant, polite, empathic, and pluralist attitude. Regarding the behavior of radicalism in the name of jihad, Muzakkir, a well-known pesantren leader in South Sulawesi, contributed in the form of thought, as he said:

The groups identified as radical groups need coaching, no need to force Western ideas and thoughts of pluralism to be embraced by society. Tafaqquh fi al-din is more important. Jihad should be performed based on its elements, namely conditions, knowledge, and manners.

Everything is clear in the tradition (turats) of knowledge of our scholars. Here is the role of pesantren to study, formulate, and socialize the true conception of jihad.

In this case, kyai as pesantren managers have a firm attitude and perception about the possibility of jihad in the present. The meaning of jihad must be based on a deeper understanding of the historicity of the jihad itself and aims at achieving peace and mutual benefit, not aiming at superiority or favoring the party itself while destroying other parties. Several studies also agree with the view of the kyai, namely denying the accusation that Islam, especially the Qur'an, teaches its adherents to commit acts of violence with the concept of jihad, that war is actually part of the final solution currently in force in international disputes and is recognized by international law. Fadil (2018) Performing worship, helping the poor, being patient and all good deeds are also jihad (Adnan, 2006). The dullness of thought and absolutism towards an idea from a particular group resulted in the disparity of the meaning of jihad, resulting in radicalism based on the teachings of jihad (Widayat, 2013). The interpretation of jihad texts must be carried out comprehensively and not ignore the socio-political historical background of the text, so that it can be fully absorbed in the understanding of jihad (Khoiriyah, 2020). Jihad today must have a direction to advance Islam for the benefit of humans and the universe. The position of Jihad by studying religion or other sciences is more important than jihad by taking up arms (Ridho, 2019). Therefore, jihad should not be used as a political propaganda tool to impose a system of power in the name of religion or khilafah. Maintaining peace and human rights is the true meaning of jihad. Admittedly, radicalism and terrorism that emerge in the modern world today are also motivated by ideological or religious factors. However, the error lies not in religious teachings or texts, but rather in inaccuracies in interpreting texts and applying religious ideology and teachings. Here pesantren play a role in the anti-radicalization of religion through education. Amirudin (2020) in his research suggests that the role of Islamic boarding schools in preventing radicalism is the planting of a wasathiyah model of understanding Islam in the curriculum, a sense of nationalism, and tolerance taught since the first santri in Islamic boarding schools, then the most important thing is the reorientation of the meaning of jihad (Amirudin, 2020). In observing and tracing informants, the author found that pesantren in South Sulawesi had a clear attitude about religious radicalism, or rather radicalism in the name of religion, which led to the distortion of the meaning of the concept of jihad. The three pesantren agree on the conclusion that violence, in any form, which is carried out in the name of religion or on the basis of the subjectivity of the truth of certain religious groups, is contrary to Islam. The informants viewed that jihad is not synonymous with violence and anarchism, but rather is a conception of how to try as hard as possible to create benefits for the people. Islamic boarding schools educate their students with moderate values (Arifinsyah, Ryandi, & Manshuruddin, 2019). The Islamic boarding school community strongly rejects terrorism and all other forms of violence. They believe that Islam is a religion of rahmatan lil alamin that does not spit violence (Abidin, 2018). This interpretation of jihad is socialized by pesantren in every opportunity, both in formal

learning, in the study of books, and in discussions in students' daily life. Santri in pesantren equate understanding violence in the form of radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism, war, demonstrations; and distinguish it from the meaning of jihad because jihad in Islam has certain rules that aim to gain goodness to humans (Ismail, 2018). That ruan guru, guru (teacher), dan santri (pupil at pesantren) have a perception in the wide meaning. Not only discussed about war and assassination but also for fighting, fight a bad desire that lead someone to negative and destructive deeds (Barni, 2009). In the view of Abunawas Bintang, radicalism in any form is strongly opposed by Muslims, especially members of pesantren. Radicalism, which is the main trigger for various acts of terrorism in various parts of the earth, is not jihad. Hard attitude, over-militantism, rigid thinking, and rejecting plurality in religion are actually not in line with the spirit of Islam itself. He explained:

I as the manager of the As'adiyah Islamic Boarding School do not agree on radical methods in religion. In Islam, indeed, there is jihad. But terrorism is not jihad. Jihad does not frighten people and does not impose. Jihad aims to convey true Islam. If one does not accept, then he is not forced: the Qur'an says لا إكراه في الدين. If nothing hinders the next steps of jihad, both in aqidah and fiqh opinions (ijtihad), then there is no compulsion.

A relatively similar view was expressed by Amir Jannatin. According to him, jihad cannot be connoted to bloodshed or any means that endanger others in preventing munkar. In his interview, he stressed:

Jihad is a spirit of religion. Without it, religion is just like a puppet without power. But, jihad is not meant to justify all kinds of means to achieve goals. The Prophet gave instructions in preventing munkar, namely by hand (strength or power), words, and heart. There is a relationship between the meaning of power with the advice of da'wah with wisdom. Strength does not always mean violence. Strength and wisdom must be in parallel. If you are not able to do that with your power, then prevent that with words of mouth and mind.

Abu Nu'aim al-Ashbahani in Hilyat al-Awliya' wa Thabaqat al-Ashfiya' mentioned a hadith narrated by Ali bin Abi Thalib:

الجهاد أربع: أمر بالمعروف ونهي عن المنكر والصدق في مواطن الصبر وشنان الفاسقين

meaning

"Jihad is fourfold: enjoining goodness, preventing evil, acting rightly in a place that demands patience, and hating the wicked."

This hadith confirms that war is not the only choice in practicing jihad (Al-Ashbahani, 1996). The war is carried out at moments and conditions that are indeed demanding, or arguably forced, bloodshed against a real enemy of Islam. Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, being patient, and instilling hatred in wickedness are considered as jihad applied to the general condition of Muslims. Among contemporary scholars who have this understanding is Yusuf Qardhawi. In his book, Fiqh al-Zakāt, he elaborated his views on the substance of jihad. Al-Qardawi (1969) tended not to broaden the scope of jihad fi sabilillah to include all good and beneficial deeds, as it also does not narrow its scope so that it is limited to war. Sometimes jihad uses pen and word, or sword or weapon. Sometimes it is performed in the form of thought, educational, social, economic, or political endeavors, or (if necessary) military actions (Al-Qardawi, 1969). Furthermore, Al-Qardawi (1969) argued that various forms of Islamic efforts, programs, and activities carried out seriously, although textually not included as part of jihad according to the text, must be included as jihad (based on qiyas) because all of them are practices aimed at helping and defending the religion of Allah (li nashri dīnillah wa l'āi kalimatih), and fighting His enemies and eliminating polytheism and disbelief from earth (Al-Qardawi, 1969). Associated with the behavior of anarchism carried out by radical Islamic groups, Amir Jannatin firmly stated:

That behavior is contrary to the ways and principles of the Prophet. Islam allows violence only to those who clearly and openly declare hostility and endanger Muslims. People who want to live side by side with Muslims peacefully are given a guarantee to live freely and practice their religious teachings. Pesantren do not teach violence, coercion of wills or opinions, and such radical behavior.

Regarding jihad and the propagation of religious authority (khilafah), Amir Jannatin said that jihad

in the form of violence did not fit into the situation and condition of Indonesia. Da'wah should be done with an approach to thinking, not in radical ways to sacrifice self and others. In addition, acts of violence in Islam must have legal reasons (such as jihad fi sabilillah, stoning for adultery, and cutting off the hands of thieves). Radicalism aimed at politics by a small number of certain Muslim communities is actually an unjustified egoism. There are laws and state rules that are enforced and must be obeyed by every citizen. Therefore, the imposition of a political system by means of violence, even though in the name of "jihad", is not justified in Islamic law. In this connection, Muhammad and Khalid (1993) has expressed his opinion that khilafah is legally found in Islamic teachings. However, besides the normative flow, there is a substantive flow, which does not require a formal form of power in the Khilafah system. He asserted that the essence of every argument is the upholding of social justice, the loss of hostility, and the avoidance of people from internal conflicts between fellow humans (Muhammad & Khalid, 1993). The developing discourse in the pesantren environment views that radicalism in the name of Islam, both in the form of ideas, thoughts, orations, and real actions, actually has a close relationship with the postulations of the distortion of the meaning of the concept of jihad. Jihad is often misunderstood as a holy war in the name of religion. Jihad is interpreted as radical efforts in the defense of Islam, getting rid of all that disturbs the sanctity and sacrality of Islamic teachings, and considering anyone who interferes with Islam and Muslims as enemies who are lawful to be killed. Admittedly, military jihad with gun resistance is one of Islamic teachings. When there are attacks and aggressions that threaten the existence of Islam and Muslims in a region, then Muslims must strive to defend themselves and their religion physically. However, the principle in Islam is very clear: retaliation must be proportional and forgiveness is prioritized. That's the noblest "jihad": jihad against lust and anger.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Religious teaching, in truth, is based on the principles of tasamuh (tolerance), humanity, and peace. These principles does not aim to eliminate the teachings of jihad in Islam but to provide an interpretation of jihad in a contextual and non-destructive manner, that is, jihad in the sense of building civilization and prosperous life, full of love, compassion, and brotherhood of fellow humans, not jihad to kill others or seeking death in the name of God, or scaring people. So it is clear that political agitation to undermine legitimate and peaceful power by using the doctrine of jihad with the aim of establishing the dominance of religious power is very vulnerable causing chaos and division, which results in animosity between Muslims. In the pesantren "fiqh" perspective, it can be explained that religious radicalism occurs due to a narrow and literal understanding of jihad, exclusivism of religious understanding, rejection of pluralism, and lack of embedded noble moral values. All this, in turn, has led to antipathy, animosity, and stereotypes towards different parties. In relation to the idea of khilafah, jihad should not be forced, but through deep consideration. The use of jihad as an excuse to act radically and fight people who disagree is a distortion far from the essence of jihad itself. Khilafah is a mandate from Allah the Creator to mankind to realize the benefit and goodness in their lives, not intended to create hostility, power struggles, let alone bloodshed in the name of religion. That noble value is the substance of jihad exemplified by the Messenger of Allah as manhaj al-nubuwwah.

Reference

- Abdulla, R. A. (2007). Islam, jihad, and terrorism in post-9/11 Arabic discussion boards. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 12(3), 1063-1081. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00363.x>
- Abdurrahman, H. (2002). Political and Spiritual Islamic Discourse: Lisan Ul-Haq.
- Abidin, Z. (2018). Terror in the Name of Jihad: A View from Islamic Boarding School People. *Fenomena*, 16(1), 39-60. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.35719/feno.v16i1.668>
- Adam, F., Abdullah, A. H., Embong, R., Salleh, M. A., & Kadir, F. K. A. (2015). Polemics of the Islamic Caliphate: A View From Ali Abd. Al-Raziq. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 6(4), 137-140. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n4s2p137>
- Adnan, P. (2006). The Meaning of Jihad and the Problem of Its Application at the Social Level. *Ulumuna*, 10(1), 41-58. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v10i1.431>
- Agama, D. (1989). Al-Quran and its translation. Bandung: Lubuk Agung.

- Ahyar, M. (2017). Is Islam Compatible With Democracy? Islamist Movement's Trajectory on Democratization in Indonesia. *Walisongo: Journal of Religious Social Research*, 25(1), 139-172. doi: [10.21580/ws.25.1.1335](https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.25.1.1335)
- Ahyar, M. (2018). ALMAWARDI AND THE CONCEPTS OF THE ISLAMIC CHILFARE: THE RELEVANCE OF THE CLASSIC AND MODERN POLITICAL ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. . *Al-A'raf: Journal of Islamic Thought and Philosophy*, 15(1), 1-26. doi: <https://dx.doi.org/10.22515/ajpif.v15i1.1123>
- Al-Ashbahani, A. b. A. (1996). *Hilyat al-Awliya wa Thabaqat al-Ashfiya*. Beirut: Dar Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyyah.
- Al-Buthi, M. S. R. (1993). *Al-Jihād fi'l-Islām Kaifa Nafhamuhu wa Kaifa Numarisuhu*. . Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr.
- Al-Nabhani, T. (2002). *Al-Syakhshiyah al-Islamiyyah* (1 ed.): Dar al-Ummah.
- Al-Qardawi, Y. (1969). *Fiqh Al-Zakah*. Beirut: Darul Irsyad.
- Ali, S. S., & Rehman, J. (2005). The concept of Jihad in Islamic international law. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 10(3), 321-343. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kri017>
- Amirudin, Y. (2020). The Role of Islamic Boarding Schools in Preventing Religious Radicalism. *TABYIN: JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION*, 2(1), 92-103. doi: <https://doi.org/10.29138/tabyin.v2i1.24>
- Arifinsyah, A., Ryandi, R., & Manshuruddin, M. (2019). Pesantren Religious Paradigm: Aqeedah, Plurality, and Jihad. . *The Journal of Society and Media*, 3(2), 278-298. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v3n2.p278-298>
- Asmara, M. (2016). Reinterpretation of the Meaning of Jihad and Terrorism. *Al-Istinbath: Journal of Islamic Law*, 1(1), 63-80. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v1i1.87>
- Azra, A., & Al-Jauhari, A. (1996). *Islamic political upheaval: From fundamentalism, modernism to post-modernism* (1 ed.): Paramadina.
- Barni, M. (2009). PERCEPTIONS OF MOST TEACHERS, TEACHERS AND SANTRI PONDOK PENSTREN IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN ABOUT JIHAD. *Khazanah: Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities*, 6(2), 79-105. doi: <https://dx.doi.org/10.18592/khazanah.v6i2.3139>
- Chirzin, M. (2006). Reactualization of Jihad Fi Sabil Al-lah in the Context of Contemporary and Indonesian. . *Ulumuna*, 10(1), 59-80. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujs.v10i1.432>
- Fadil, M. R. (2018). The Existence and Contextualization of the Jihad Concept. . *MAGHZA: Journal of the Science of the Qur'an and Tafsir*, 3(2), 202-213. doi: <https://doi.org/10.24090/maghza.v3i2.2134>
- Faqihuddin, A. (2021). Moderate Islam in Indonesia. . *Al-Risalah: Journal of Religious Studies and Islamic Thought*, 12(1), 107-118. doi: <https://doi.org/10.34005/alrisalah.v12i1.1238>
- Fuad, A. J., & 'Arifuddin, M. (2021). Deradicalization in Textbooks of Islamic Religious Education Material with Radicalism in Schools. *Intellectual Journal: Journal of Islamic Education and Studies*, 11(1), 1-16. doi: <https://doi.org/10.33367/ji.v11i1.1579>
- Haddade, A., Harisah, A., & Irsyad, M. (2017). *Jihad in Islam: Peace or Violence ?* Yogyakarta: Lembaga Ladang Kata. Retrieved from <http://repository.uin-alauddin.ac.id/id/eprint/15152>.
- Haikal, M. K. (1996a). *Al-Jihad wa Al-Qital fi As-Siyasah As-Syar'iyyah*. Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm.
- Haikal, M. K. (1996b). *Jihad and fighting in politics Sir'ah* (2 ed.). Beirut: Dar al-Biyaraq.
- Irawan, D. (2014). Controversy about the meaning and concept of jihad in the Koran about creating peace. . *Religion: Journal of the Study of Religions*, 10(1), 67-88. doi: <https://doi.org/10.14421/rejusta.2014.1001-05>
- Ismail, S. (2018). Islamic Boarding Schools and JIHAD ISSUES (Study on Manado Development Work Islamic Boarding Schools. *Al-Qalam*, 13(1), 51-66. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.31969/alq.v13i1.575>
- Jauhari, M., Suryandaru, Y. S., & Sugihartati, R. (2021). hilafah Dialectics and National Politics in Cyber Public Media. *Religious: Journal of Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies*, 5(2), 199-216. doi: <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v5i2.11343>
- Kartini, I. (2016). Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia and the Idea of Restoring Islamic Caliphate. *Indonesian Society*, 41(1), 1-14. doi: <https://doi.org/10.14203/jmi.v41i1.238>
- Khaldun, I. (2011). Muqaddimah. *The Journal of Economic History*, 19(1), b1-b5. doi: [10.1017/S0022050700107776](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700107776)
- Khoiriyah, A. (2020). The concept of Jihad: between Normativeity and Historicity. *al-Afkar, Journal For Islamic Studies*, 3(1, January), 115-136. doi: https://doi.org/10.31943/afkar_journal.v3i1,%20January.90

- Liebl, V. (2009). The Caliphate. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(3), 373-391. doi: [10.1080/00263200902853355](https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200902853355)
- Ma'afi, R. a. H., & Muttaqin, M. (2012). The Concept of Jihad in an Islamic Perspective. *Kalimah: Journal of Religious Studies and Islamic Thought*, 11(1), 134-139. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.21111/klm.v11i1.488>
- Mohammad, N. (1985). The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction. *Journal of Law and Religion*, 3(2), 381-397. doi: [10.2307/1051182](https://doi.org/10.2307/1051182)
- Muhammad, A. a.-H. A. b., & Khalid, U. b. H. (1993). *Sultanate rulings and religious jurisdiction: Institute of Traditional Islamic Studies*.
- Munadzir, M. (2017). THE CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP ACCORDING TO SYU'BAH ASA. . *Al-A'raf: Journal of Islamic Thought and Philosophy*, 14(2), 253-266. doi: <https://dx.doi.org/10.22515/ajpif.v14i2.891>
- Rasyid, M. M. R. (2016). *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia: failed to understand the caliphate.:* Compass library.
- Ridho, A. (2019). Understanding the Meaning of Jihad in the Cisform Cartoon Film Series: Jihad Fi Sabilillah (Teun A. Van Dijk Discourse Analysis). . *Journal of Da'wah and Communication*, 4(1), 1-20. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.29240/jdk.v4i1.873>
- Rumadi. (2002). Jihad and Terrorism. In *Post-Theological Society, A New Face of Religion and Democratization of Indonesia* (1 ed.). Indonesia: Press Cluster.
- Siregar, S. (2018). The Islamic Khilafah in the Historical Perspective of Ali Abdul Raziq's Thought. *JUSPI (Journal of the History of Islamic Civilization)*, 2(1), 124-137. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.30829/j.v2i1.1794>
- Susanto, E. (2006). Multicultural Based Religious Education. *Karsa: Social and Cultural Journal*, XI(2006), 782-789.
- Tahrir, H. (2005). *The organs of the Khilafah state in governance and administration*. (1 ed.). Beirut: Darul Ummah.
- Tambunan, E. (2019). *INDONESIAN ISLAMISM: The War of Islamic Literacy from Millennialism to Radicalism*. *ACADEMICS: Journal of Islamic Thought*, 24(1), 1-38. doi: <https://e-journal.metrouniv.ac.id/index.php/akademika/article/view/1612>
- Turner, J. (2020). Manufacturing the Jihad in Europe: The Islamic State's Strategy. *The International Spectator*, 55(1), 112-125. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1712136>
- Umar, U. i. M. I. (1999). Jihad and Ijtihad are ta'oollah in the curricula: Dar al-Bayariq.
- Wibowo, P. (2020). ECURITIZATION OF KHILAFAT DISCOURSE IN INDONESIA. *Jisera: The Journal of Islamic Studies and International Relations*, 5(1), 25-49. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4052347>
- Widayat, P. A. (2013). Arguments for the Meaning of Jihad in the Al-Quran Viewed from the Perspective of a Cosmopolitan Society. . *ACADEMIC: Journal of Islamic Thought*, 18(2), 255-276. doi: <https://e-journal.metrouniv.ac.id/index.php/akademika/article/view/399>
- ZAKI, M. (2020). THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KHILAFAT: STUDY ON THE NEW KMA 183 CURRICULUM FOR MADRASAH. *Politea : Journal of Islamic Politics*, 3(2), 173-184. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20414/politea.v3i2.2493>